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Abstract: Several arguments derived from fiscal federalism theory suggest 
that decentralization may lead to improved levels of efficiency in the 
provision of public goods and services. The aim of this study is to examine 
this hypothesis by evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational 
outcomes in Spain. These are measured using a survival rate, defined as the 
ratio between the number of students who enrolled in upper-secondary (non-
compulsory) education and the number of students enrolled in the final year of 
lower-secondary (compulsory) education during the previous academic year. 
We use a panel data set comprising the 50 provinces of Spain for the years 
1978 to 2005, a period that covers the entire process of decentralization. Since 
education competences were devolved to the regions at different points in 
time, we can estimate the effects of these reforms by applying the differences-
in-differences method and by using the non-decentralized autonomous regions 
as the comparison group. We find that decentralization in Spain had a positive 
impact on educational outcomes when pupils on vocational training 
programmes are not taken into account, and that the richer the region is the 
more marked the effect becomes. However, this improvement in educational 
outcomes is achieved at the expense of enrolment in vocational training 
programmes. These effects might reflect a better match between population 
preferences and educational policies consequent upon decentralization.        
 
 
Resum: Diversos arguments derivats de la teoria del federalisme fiscal 
suggereixen que la descentralització pot portar a majors nivells d’eficiència en 
la provisió de béns i serveis publics. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi és contrastar 
aquesta hipòtesi mitjançant l’avaluació dels efectes de la descentralització 
sobre els resultats educatius a Espanya. Els resultats educatius es mesuren 
d’acord amb la taxa de supervivència, que es defineix com el nombre 
d’estudiants que es matricula en educació secundària no obligatòria en relació 
als alumnes matriculats a l’últim curs d’educació obligatòria durant l’any 
acadèmic anterior. Per dur a terme aquest anàlisi utilitzem un panell de dades 
format per les 50 províncies d’Espanya i els anys 1978 a 2005, període que 
cobreix tot el procés de descentralització. Donat que les competències 
educatives varen ser descentralitzades cap a les comunitats autònomes en 
diferents moments del temps, podem estimar els efectes d’aquestes reformes 
fent servir el mètode de diferències en diferències, utilitzant les regions no 
descentralitzades en cada moment del temps com a grup de control. Els 
resultats de l’estudi indiquen que la descentralització a Espanya va tenir un 
impacte positiu sobre els resultats educatius quan els alumnes que es 
matriculen en programes de formació professional no es tenen en compte, i 
que com més rica es la regió més accentuat és aquest efecte. No obstant, 
aquesta millora dels resultats educatius s’aconsegueix en detriment de la 
matriculació en programes de formació professional. Aquests resultats poden 
estar reflectint un millor ajust entre les preferències de la població i les 
polítiques educatives com a conseqüència de la descentralització.        
 
 
JEL codes: H11, H43, H52, I28. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fiscal federalism theory identifies a number of mechanisms via which 
decentralization may lead to improved levels of efficiency in the provision of public 
goods and services, both in terms of allocative and productive efficiency1. Thus, it has 
been claimed that local governments have a better knowledge of their population’s 
preferences and needs (Oates, 1972) so that, under certain circumstances, 
decentralization can ensure a better match between political decisions and local 
preferences (preference-matching argument). Moreover, it is believed that 
decentralization can increase political participation, which in turn should ensure that 
local governments are more responsive to citizen demands than the central government 
tends to be (Shah, 1998). Closely related to this, decentralization is thought to increase 
the degree of political accountability of the government, which should serve as an 
incentive for a government to act in the best interests of its citizens (Seabright, 1996).  
Given these arguments, in recent years several countries have initiated processes of 
decentralization with the aim of improving accountability and efficiency in their 
provision of public goods and services (Stegarescu, 2005). Other factors, such as 
separatist forces, have also promoted decentralization in various countries, including 
Indonesia and Russia. However, the benefits of decentralization need to be contrasted 
with any potential drawbacks before the system can be deemed superior in terms of 
social welfare and efficiency. Fiscal federalism theory has typically identified spillover 
effects and economies of scale as the main disadvantages of decentralization, since they 
can reduce the efficiency with which public goods and services are provided. More 
recently, Prud’homme (1995) claimed that decentralization may lead to higher levels of 
corruption since local authorities are more prone to being captured by local elites than 
central governments are. However, a number of analyses that have analysed the 
relationship between decentralization and lobbying conclude that the effects of 
decentralization on corruption are ambiguous and context-specific, indicating the need 
for empirical studies (Redoano, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2005). Thus, the theory remains inconclusive regarding the effects of 
decentralization, and empirical analyses are required.  
                                                 
1 Productive efficiency is interpreted here in a broad sense to include inefficiencies such as 
corruption, waste and poor governance. 
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Yet despite this need, empirical studies on this issue have, until recently, been 
virtually non-existent. Specifically, the relationship between decentralization and 
allocative efficiency has only been studied in Faguet (2004) and Solé-Ollé and Esteller-
Moré (2005). Similarly, the literature examining the relationship between 
decentralization and productive efficiency remains limited and, more often than not, 
reports contradictory conclusions. One such example is provided by Barankay and 
Lockwood (2007), who analyse the effects of decentralization on the productive 
efficiency of government in education policy.  
Thus, at a time when decentralization policies are gaining in popularity, we believe 
it timely to undertake additional studies of their effects. Specifically, the aim of this 
paper is to evaluate the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain. As 
we see below, in the last two decades Spain has been involved in a far-reaching process 
of decentralization to the extent that today it is one of the most decentralized economies 
in Europe. As in many other countries, its education policy has been one of the areas 
most affected by decentralization. And, because of the way in which the process has 
evolved in Spain, we are able to apply the differences-in-differences methodology to 
estimate its effects. As the country’s regions received their educational powers at 
different points in time, we can use the autonomous regions that did not undergo 
decentralization in each time period as the comparison group for the decentralized 
regions. To do so, we constructed a panel data set containing information on the 50 
provinces of Spain for the period 1978-2005, a period that covers the entire process of 
decentralization.  
Educational outcomes, here, are measured using the survival rate, defined as the 
proportion of pupils in the final year of lower-secondary (compulsory) education who 
successfully complete the grade and enrol in upper-secondary (non-compulsory) 
education. There are at least two reasons for our interest in the proportion of students 
who choose to remain in full-time education after finishing compulsory education. First, 
in a country where enrolment rates in compulsory education are close to 100%, as is the 
case in Spain, it seems appropriate to use a variable that measures the proportion of 
students that stay on at school after this period to measure educational attainment. 
Second, and most importantly, recent evidence shows that each year a large number of 
young people in Spain fail to obtain the basic school diploma that certifies completion 
of lower-secondary education, and so are unable to proceed to upper-secondary 
education (Fuentes, 2009). As a consequence, upper-secondary graduation rates in 
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Spain remain low in international comparisons and, thus, raising both lower- and upper-
secondary education graduation rates should be now one of the main objectives facing 
educational policy in Spain. 
Our results show that decentralization in Spain has increased the proportion of 
students that enrol in upper-secondary education (Bachillerato) upon completion of 
lower-secondary education (ESO). We also find that the richer the Autonomous 
Community is, the greater the positive effects of this decentralization process have been. 
However, when we include the students that chose to enrol on vocational training 
programmes upon completion of ESO in our survival rate measure, the effects of 
decentralization are negative or non-significant. Given that Bachillerato (a general 
academic programme) is the chosen avenue into upper-secondary education for most 
ESO graduates, and that the attractiveness of vocational education is much lower than 
that of this general programme, these negative effects might reflect a better match 
between population preferences and educational policies consequent upon 
decentralization. The effects of decentralization on the educational sector in Spain have 
only previously been studied in Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré (2005), where the focus 
was specifically on the allocative efficiency of decentralization. The authors concluded 
that Spanish decentralization has improved allocative efficiency, in both education and 
road investment, a finding that is line with our results here.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the 
literature that has examined the effects of decentralization. Here, fiscal federalism 
theory has advanced a number of arguments in favour and against decentralization, and 
these serve as the theoretical framework for the empirical studies that have sought to 
verify these arguments. Section 3 describes the main features of the educational sector 
in Spain, with particular reference to the decentralization of the system. Section 4 
describes the methodology we use in the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses some 
empirical issues, principally the variables that are included in the analysis and our data 
sources. Section 6 presents the results we obtain from the analysis. Section 7 provides 
further analyses to corroborate the robustness of our results. Finally, the last section 
reports the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The theory 
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Fiscal federalism theory has traditionally presented decentralization movements as a 
trade-off between potential benefits, in terms of both productive and allocative 
efficiency, and possible drawbacks, that stem from the existence of spillover effects and 
economies of scale.  
The Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 1972) claims that, in the absence of 
externalities and economies of scale, the decentralized provision of public goods will 
always be preferable in terms of social welfare to that of a centralized provision. This is 
because it is assumed that regional governments are better informed about local 
preferences and circumstances than the central government is, and this ensures that they 
are more responsive to local needs and are better placed to match local preferences with 
the provision of public goods and services (preference-matching argument). Oates’ 
conclusions are based on the assumption that while central government results in a 
uniform provision of public goods, local governments can differentiate between regions 
on the basis of heterogeneous local tastes and needs. The justification for this argument 
is the limited access central government has to information about local circumstances, 
and the various political problems that may prevent the central government from 
providing access to heterogeneous levels of public goods and services between the 
regions.  
More recently, the political economy literature has relaxed this hypothesis by the 
modelling of legislative behaviour in central government (Lockwood, 2002; Besley and 
Coate, 2003). These studies seem to confirm, however, Oates’ conclusion that 
decentralization is preferable when externalities are small and/or when there exists a 
high degree of heterogeneity between regions. Yet, differences can be identified 
between the two approaches. First, in the new political economy approach, the costs of 
centralization are not derived from a uniform level of provision of public goods, but 
rather from the inefficient spending decisions made by the central legislative body. 
Secondly, the arguments forwarded in support of the belief that centralization improves 
efficiency in the presence of externalities also differ greatly. In Oates’ approach, 
centralization is preferable under these circumstances as the process allows spillover 
effects to be internalised. However, in the political economy literature, externalities 
influence central government incentives to allocate funds efficiently. 
Thus, the general conclusion to be drawn from these theoretical studies is that, if 
externalities are low and districts heterogeneous, decentralization will improve 
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allocative efficiency. However, there is an implicit assumption to this proposition that 
should not be overlooked. These studies assume that governments are benevolent, in the 
sense that they act in the best interests of their citizens. This hypothesis, however, has 
been called into question by more than one author in recent years, as governments might 
very well prioritise their own interests or be under the sway of lobbies and rent-seeking 
groups, resulting in  reduced productive efficiency. Seabright (1996), for example, has 
modelled the way in which decentralization can affect a government’s incentive to act 
in the best interests of its citizens. This author argues that government incentives 
depend on the degree of political accountability, defined as the probability that the 
welfare of a given region might determine the re-election of the government. Since 
political accountability or the electoral control over incumbents is greater at the local 
level, decentralized governments will have more incentives than centralized authorities 
to act in accordance with the preferences of the population and, therefore, be less 
corrupt (accountability argument). Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Hindriks and 
Lockwood (2005) reach similar conclusions about the relationship between 
decentralization, political accountability and government behaviour.  
Despite the above definition of political accountability, the literature usually 
considers this term in a broader sense as the electoral rules and other institutional 
mechanisms that constrain the rent-seeking activities of office holders, such as the 
taking bribes, favouring of particular interest groups and insufficient innovation and 
effort. Thus, in order to determine the impact of decentralization, Lockwood (2006) has 
proposed focusing on two possible aspects of accountability: the degree to which 
institutions allow the government to divert rents, and the degree to which institutions 
allow special interest groups to distort government decision-making through their 
lobbying activity. In fact, various studies have focused on this relationship between 
decentralization and lobbying, and conclude that the effects of decentralization on 
corruption are ambiguous and context-specific, indicating the need for empirical studies 
(Redoano, 2007; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005).  
 
2.2 Empirical work 
 
As we have seen, theoretical analyses do not allow us to draw any definitive 
conclusions regarding the superiority of centralised or decentralised systems in terms of 
their respective economic efficiency. Improved political accountability resulting from 
 8
decentralization and increased allocative efficiency must be set against any externalities 
which arise from spillovers between localities. It has also been argued that the 
combination of the decentralization of expenditures and the centralization of tax 
collection means that subcentral governments have an unclear perception of hard budget 
constraints, which causes them to overspend and to be inefficient (Wildasin, 1997). 
Thus, the net benefits of decentralization are likely to vary between policies and 
localities, so that the choice between centralized and decentralized forms of government 
is highly sensitive (Seabright, 1996) and  probably context specific, which makes 
empirical studies necessary. However, the empirical literature examining the effects of 
decentralization on both allocative and productive efficiency has, until recently, been 
virtually non-existent and, indeed, continues to be somewhat scarce.  
Faguet (2004) and Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré (2005) examine the influence of 
decentralization on allocative efficiency by determining whether the process has had an 
impact on investment patterns (across Bolivian municipalities in the first instance and 
Spanish provinces in the second), and the extent to which these changes could be related 
to objective measures of needs. Both studies conclude that decentralization has led to a 
better adjustment between investment patterns and needs, corroborating one of the main 
theories of fiscal federalism. However, Akin et al. (2005), in their analysis of the 
allocation of funds between public and non-public goods in Uganda, conclude that the 
regional governments tend to allocate fewer resources than the central government to 
public good activities, implying that social welfare is weakened with decentralization.   
Most of the empirical literature analysing the impact of decentralization on 
productive efficiency has not attempted to identify with any degree of precision the 
particular channels discussed above. Rather, as discussed by Barankay and Lockwood 
(2007), the general approach has involved examining the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and certain key observable factors of governance, such as measures of 
outcomes in a given policy area or political, economic or social indicators. In the 
education sector, which is the focus of the present study, Habibi et al. (2001) report a 
positive impact of decentralization on educational outcomes in Argentina when using 
the ratio of students enrolled in secondary school per thousand primary students as their 
dependent variable. Likewise, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2001) and Galiani, Gertler 
and Schargrodsky (2008) find a positive impact of decentralization in the same country 
on educational outcomes (measured using the standardized test scores of Argentine 
students), but only in provinces that do not report a very large fiscal deficit. Similar 
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results are reported in Barankay and Lockwood (2007) in their analysis of the effects of 
decentralization on educational attainment (measured according to the maturité rate, 
i.e., the ratio between the number of students obtaining the university entrance 
qualification and the number of 19 year olds in the population) in the Swiss cantons. 
Faguet and Sanchez (2008) also present evidence of improved educational outcomes in 
Colombia (measured as the year-on-year increase in student enrolment) as a result of 
decentralization. However, the literature also reports instances in which decentralization 
has no impact on educational outcomes. This is the case of Mahal et al. (2000), who 
even report negative effects of decentralization on primary health care and education in 
India, and Treisman (2002), who analyses the effects of decentralization on youth 
illiteracy rates, as a measure of the quality of public services in basic education, for a 
cross-section of 91 countries.  
Finally, the several studies that have examined the relationship between 
decentralization and corruption also report contradictory findings. While Treisman 
(2002) presents quite convincing evidence to suggest that decentralization leads to 
higher levels of perceived corruption, Fisman and Gatti (2001) and Huther and Shah 
(1998) conclude just the opposite.  
Thus, reports regarding the effects of decentralization on government quality and 
educational outcomes are somewhat contradictory. Given these contradictions, and the 
fact that the case of Spain has only been analysed in Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré 
(2005), and then solely in terms of allocative efficiency, we consider an empirical 
analysis of the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain to be of 
great interest.  
 
3. The main features of the education sector in Spain 
 
3.1 Spain’s education system 
 
The education system in Spain has undergone several reforms during the last thirty 
years, in response to the changing needs of an economy that has developed greatly 
during this period. In 1970, the Ley General de Educación (LGE) made education free 
and compulsory until the age of 14. In addition, the law introduced vocational training 
into the education system as an alternative pathway to academic study upon completion 
of compulsory education and to facilitate young people’s entry into the labour market. 
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In 1985, the Ley Orgánica Reguladora del Derecho a la Educación created the state-
assisted schools, which combined free education (in private schools) with parental 
discretion regarding the school to which they could send their children. However, the 
basic structure of the education system was not altered until 1990, when the Ley 
Orgánica de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo (LOGSE) extended 
compulsory education to the age of 16, and created advanced vocational training 
schools.  
Despite this reform, and the compulsory extension of school attendance to the age of 
16, each year a large number of youths fail to obtain the basic school diploma certifying 
successful completion of ESO. Given that these pupils cannot therefore proceed to 
upper-secondary education, a large number of unskilled workers enter the Spanish 
labour market. Further, the net enrolment rates in upper-secondary education in Spain 
are lower than those in most other European countries as are Spain’s graduation rates 
when compared internationally (Fuentes, 2009). Only Luxemburg, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom figured below Spain in 2004 in terms of their net enrolment rates at the 
age of 18, while there was a gap of more than twenty percent with Finland and Sweden, 
which had net enrolment rates above 90 percent. However, marked differences can be 
observed between the regions of Spain. Thus, in 2004, while the net enrolment rate at 
the age of 17 was 92.6 percent in País Vasco, in line with Europe’s best performing 
countries, it was only 61.1 percent in Baleares.  
Enrolment on vocational training programmes is lower than that on general 
academic programmes in all the regions of Spain. This is mainly because the 
educational pathway Bachillerato is the favoured route for admission into university, 
but it may also reflect the high failure rate of pupils in lower-secondary education, 
which is likely to depress participation of vocationally interested pupils in upper-
secondary education. As a consequence, graduation rates for vocationally-oriented 
degrees are also very low when compared internationally.        
Thus, one of the main challenges that the Spanish education system currently faces 
is how to raise its number of upper-secondary education graduates. As signalled in 
several studies, this first requires reducing the number of youths who are unable to 
proceed to upper-secondary education because they fail to obtain the basic school 
diploma that certifies completion of lower-secondary education. Although we do not 
have data on early school leavers, we can compute the proportion of students enrolled in 
the final year of lower-secondary education (i.e.,  compulsory education) who choose to 
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remain at school to study upper-secondary education as full-time students. A similar 
measure has been used in Pissarides (1981) to analyse the demand for post-compulsory 
education in England and Wales. Likewise, the OECD used a similar measure in 
Education at a Glance 1992, to analyse higher education survival (OECD, 1992).  
 
3.2 Decentralization process  
 
We can trace the process of decentralization in Spain back to 1978, when the 
Spanish Constitution was enacted. The 1978 Constitution clearly laid down the 
foundations that would enable Spain to become one of the most decentralized 
economies in Europe. Thus, it established the right of Spanish provinces to unite to 
form autonomous regions (17 Self-governing Communities were formed from the 50 
provinces) and specified the division of powers between the central government and the 
new autonomous or regional governments. In the education sector, the Constitution 
upheld the central government’s power to define the structure of the state’s education 
system, to regulate the requirements for the obtaining, issue and standardization of 
academic degrees and professional qualifications and to establish the basic rules to 
guarantee the unity of the Spanish education system. All other responsibilities in the 
sector, however, were devolved to the regional governments.  
One of the main features of Spain’s process of decentralization has been the 
asymmetrical manner in which it has been conducted (García-Milà and McGuire, 2002). 
While provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, islands 
and provinces with a historic regional status were able to accede to all the powers not 
specifically assigned to the central government in the Constitution (section 149) 
following the approval of their Devolution Statutes (that is, Cataluña, País Vasco, 
Galicia, Andalucía, Comunidad Valenciana and Canarias), the other autonomous 
regions had to wait five years following the approval of their Devolution Statutes to be 
assigned the same powers. In practice, however, these non historic autonomous regions 
were not able to receive these educational powers until the approval of the Acuerdos 
Autonómicos de ampliación de competencias in 1992, and the transfers were not made 
effective until the final years of the nineties. As a result, the decentralization process has 
taken place over almost two decades, but today all the autonomous regions enjoy the 
same powers in the education sector. Table 1 shows the year in which the individual 
Statutes of Autonomy were introduced in each Autonomous Community and the year in 
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which educational powers were transferred to them. The fact that the different regions 
received these educational powers at different points in time allows us to estimate the 
effect of decentralization on educational outcomes by using the autonomous 
communities that are not decentralized as a comparison group for the regions that are 
decentralized in each time period.   
 
4. Methodology 
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the effects of decentralization in Spain on the 
country’s educational outcomes. As in the evaluation of any policy area, the effect of 
decentralization in any region i is given by the difference between the outcomes in this 
region at time t after decentralization and the outcomes in this region had it not been 
decentralized: 
 
α = −D NDit it itY Y  (1) 
 
where itα  denotes the individual-specific treatment effect, DitY  denotes the 
outcomes in the treated group of regions if decentralized, and NDitY  the outcomes in the 
treated group of regions had they not received educational powers (Blundell and Costa 
Dias, 2002). However, as it is impossible to observe what would have happened had 
decentralization not taken place in a particular region, NDiY  is non-observable and has to 
be estimated. When experimental data are available, the outcomes in the non-treated 
regions can be used to approximate NDiY . In our study, although we do not have any 
experimental data, we are fortunate that educational powers were devolved to the 
regions at different points in time. Thus, we can use the outcomes in the non-
decentralized regions to estimate what would have happened in the decentralized 
regions had they not been decentralized. Although the decision to decentralize was 
made on historical grounds, so that should not have been affected by any specific 
regional characteristics with an influence also on the educational outcomes, we apply 
the differences-in-differences methodology to estimate its effects. In this way, we are 
able to control for differences between regions in terms of the non-observable 
characteristics that might determine both student outcomes and the desire of regional 
 13
governments to be granted powers in the field of education. For example, the 
importance attached to education in a given society. If such differences were to exist 
and we did not control for them, a non-zero correlation between the decentralization 
variable and the error term in the outcome equation would appear, and our estimates of 
the impact of decentralization would be affected by a selection bias (Heckman and 
Hotz, 1989).  
The differences-in-differences method enables us to control for such differences by 
decomposing the error term in the outcomes equation on a region-specific fixed effect, 
iΦ , a common macro-economic effect, tθ , and a temporary individual-specific effect, 
itε  (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002), as we can see in equation (2):  
 
( )it it i t itY d α θ ε= + Φ + +  (2) 
 
where iΦ  includes the unobservable or non-measurable characteristics of provinces 
that may have an influence both on educational outcomes and on the decision whether 
to decentralize or not; tθ  allows us to control also for the temporary shocks that affect 
the outcomes of all provinces equally (for example, a central government reform); and 
itd  is the decentralization variable, which is defined with a dummy that takes the values 
1 if the province i is in a decentralized Autonomous Community in year t, and 0 
otherwise. We consider this variable to be appropriate in the case of Spain, where the 
decentralization of spending in education has also meant devolution in decision-making 
powers to the Autonomous Communities. Under these circumstances, the only 
assumption that we need so as to identify the effect of decentralization on educational 
outcomes, α , is that selection into treatment is independent of the temporary 
individual-specific effect. This ensures that the evolution of the outcomes in non-
decentralized regions is the same as they would have been in decentralized regions had 
the latter not been decentralized:  
 
( ) ( )1 0 1 0,D D ND NDt t t tY Y Y Y D− − ⊥  (3) 
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If this assumption is valid, the estimation of equation (2) for the pooled sample of 
decentralized and non-decentralized autonomous regions leads to the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET), which can be represented as follows: 
 
( ) ( )1 0 1 0D D ND NDt t t tY Y Y Yα = − − −  (4) 
 
where α  denotes the ATET, ( )0 1,D Dt tY Y  denote the outcomes for the treated group of 
regions before and after the reform, respectively, and ( )0 1,ND NDt tY Y  the outcomes of the 
control group of regions also before and after the reform. Thus, the differences-in-
differences estimator measures the excess outcome growth for the treated compared to 
the non-treated regions (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  
Given that in Spain the devolution of powers was decided on historical grounds, we 
do not expect the selection process to have been affected by the observable 
characteristics of the regions. However, differences between the two groups of regions 
could appear simply because of the fact we are dealing with only 17 Autonomous 
Regions in Spain. We can assess the importance of this non-random selection in base to 
the observable characteristics of the regions by simple comparison of these 
characteristics in the two groups of regions before decentralization was initiated. Should 
it be the case that before treatment decentralized and non-decentralized regions 
presented systematic differences in their observable characteristics that might be 
considered as being associated with the dynamics of the outcome variable, these then 
ought to be included in the regression to solve the selection problem (Abadie, 2005). 
When these control variables are included in equation (2) we obtain the so-called linear 
matching with differences-in-differences estimator, which was first proposed by 
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998). By including these control variables in the 
regression we ensure that we are comparing the outcomes of decentralized regions with 
the outcomes in non-decentralized regions that have similar observable characteristics, 
and thus, which would respond in the same way to the decentralization policy. In that 
case, assumption (3) above continues to be valid, but only conditional on the observable 
characteristics of the regions included in the regression function, X : 
 
( ) ( )1 0 1 0, |D D ND NDt t t tY Y Y Y D X− − ⊥  (5) 
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This is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) needed for the matching 
estimator to be consistent, on a redefined outcome variable, namely the growth in the 
outcomes. However, this is a weaker assumption than CIA, in that there is scope for 
selection both on observables and non-observable characteristics, as long as these are 
fixed over time and additively separable. As we have seen, this model allows any kind 
of dependence between selection for treatment, itd , and the region-specific component, 
iΦ , i.e., it allows for fixed effects. Thus, we first need to take first differences to get rid 
of the regional fixed effects in order to identify the rest of the parameters, and then to 
apply pooled OLS to the differences equation (Wooldridge, 2002). We compute robust 
variance estimates and conduct our estimations by clustering the error term by 
autonomous communities, in order to adjust the standard errors for intragroup 
correlation (between provinces in the same autonomous community) and to obtain a 
variance covariance matrix which is consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern 
within regions over time (Bertrand et al., 2004).  
By employing this method, we obtain consistent estimators under the assumption of 
strict exogeneity of the regressors. As we have seen, when selection depends only on 
the non-observable characteristics of the regions that are constant over time, the 
decomposition of the error term implied by the differences-in-differences approach 
implies the strict exogeneity of the decentralization variable, and our estimations will be 
consistent. If other control variables must be included in the regression, these variables 
must also accomplish the strict exogeneity assumption for their coefficients to be 
consistently estimated. Since the educational process is cumulative, we need to include 
the first lag of the outcomes variable in order to control for past educational inputs 
(Todd and Wolpin, 2003) and to avoid any kind of correlation between the error term 
and the past, present and future values of the explanatory variables.  
 
5. Empirical issues 
 
5.1. Variables 
 
The main objective of this empirical study is to analyse the effects of the 
decentralization of education in Spain on educational attainment. Several variables have 
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been proposed in the literature to measure educational attainment, including: the net 
enrolment rate (Mahal et al., 2000), average test scores in Language and Maths (Galiani 
and Schargrodsky, 2001) and the ratio between the number of students obtaining the 
university entrance qualification and the number of 19 year olds in the population 
(Barankay and Lockwood, 2007). Here, we measure educational attainment by using the 
survival rate, defined as the ratio between the number of students that choose to stay on 
at school to study Bachillerato (non-compulsory) and the number of students enrolled in 
the final year of lower-secondary (compulsory) education in each province (in the 
previous year). As an alternative measure of educational outcomes, we also define a 
survival rate that not only includes pupils who enrol for Bachillerato upon completion 
of their compulsory education, but also those that enrol on vocational training 
programmes. Habibi et al. (2001) used a similar measure, defined as the ratio of 
students enrolled in secondary school per thousand primary school students. Similarly, 
Pissarides (1981) defines a similar measure to analyse the demand for post-compulsory 
education in England and Wales. In a country where enrolment rates in compulsory 
education are close to 100%, as is the case in Spain, it seems appropriate to use a 
variable that measures the proportion of students that stay on at school after this period 
to measure educational attainment. 
The literature contains a wide-ranging debate regarding the best determinants of 
educational attainment, but its conclusions are not always clear. According to 
Hanusheck’s meta-analyses (1986; 2003) school inputs are not significant in explaining 
educational attainment, at least insofar as they are typically measured in the literature. 
Rather, family characteristics – including income, parental education or family 
structure, have been found to be of greater importance in accounting for educational 
outcomes. However, recent empirical studies of the effects of class size on educational 
attainment, based on experimental data (Krueger, 1999), instrumental variables methods 
(Angrist and Lavy, 1999) and on a very rich data set that allowed the main potential 
endogeneity problems affecting the education production functions to be eliminated 
(Rivkin et al., 2005), suggest that class size reductions have a positive and significant 
effect on educational attainment. The most likely reason why these studies reach such 
different conclusions is that the statistical models used in estimating these relationships 
are misspecified and fail to account for the major determinants of achievement. When 
analysing the cognitive achievement of children, it is essential to have access to data 
regarding all past and present family and school inputs. Since the researcher typically 
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does not enjoy access to such data, highly restrictive assumptions are needed to justify 
some of the specifications that are commonly used in the literature, mainly the 
contemporaneous specification and the value added specification. The main problem of 
the contemporaneous specification is that all past school and family inputs are omitted 
in the regression, which probably results in biased and inconsistent estimates unless 
highly restrictive and non reasonable assumptions are fulfilled. By contrast, the value-
added specification can lead to consistent estimates under the assumption that a lagged 
outcome variable provides a sufficient statistic for all historical inputs, but only when 
contemporaneous inputs have not been omitted (Todd and Wolpin, 2003).  
As we have seen, to obtain consistent estimates of the effects of decentralization we 
only need to include the determinants of educational outcomes if there were pre-
treatment differences in the decentralized and non decentralized regions. Thus, we first 
need to determine whether in Spain in 1980 there were any differences in these 
variables between the regions that would be decentralized in the eighties and those that 
would be decentralized at a later date in the following decade. In line with previous 
discussions of education production functions, we consider the potential determinants of 
educational attainment in Spain to be the pupil/teacher ratio, as a measure of school 
inputs; per capita income and the schooling of the active population, as measures of 
family inputs or characteristics; the unemployment rate as being representative of the 
broader context of the educational sector; and the first lag of the survival rate, as a 
measure of past school and family inputs. If we were to include these variables in the 
regression, we would expect the coefficient of the pupil/teacher ratio to be negative, 
whereby the lower the pupil/teacher ratio is, the better the educational outcomes are. 
Family characteristics, measured by per capita income and schooling variables, are 
expected to have a positive influence on educational outcomes. First, we suppose that 
low income families are not able to spend as much as high income families are on their 
children’s education (for example, paying for private lessons), and that this will 
negatively affect a child’s educational attainment as defined above. In addition, school 
pupils from low income families may have to spend more time working than their 
higher income counterparts, and this might also have an impact on their educational 
attainment. Second, family background has also been demonstrated to have a positive 
influence on a child’s school performance, as it would seem that more highly educated 
parents attach greater importance to education than less educated parents tend to do. The 
unemployment rate can influence pupils’ decision making, in the sense that a high 
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unemployment rate will encourage them to stay on at school after finishing compulsory 
education. Although the omission of contemporaneous inputs could affect the 
coefficient of the input variables, we would expect the coefficient of the 
decentralization variable not to be affected by this problem, since it should not be 
correlated with the omitted variables.  
 
5.2. Data sources and definition of variables 
 
The data consist of a panel data set incorporating the 50 provinces of Spain. Given 
that the decentralization process in Spain was set in motion at the beginning of the 
eighties and finished at the end of the nineties, we analyse the period 1978-2005. In this 
way, we have observations both before and after the decentralization process, as is 
required in order to apply the differences-in-differences estimation method.  
The survival rate is defined as the ratio between the number of students in each 
province that are enrolled in upper-secondary education and the number of students who 
were enrolled in the final year of lower-secondary education (one year before). This 
variable seeks, therefore, to measure the proportion of final-year ESO students who stay 
on at school and study the Bachillerato. We also consider a survival rate which includes 
both those pupils that enrol in Bachillerato and those that enrol on Vocational Training 
Cycles upon completion of ESO. Both measures of the survival rate include pupils in 
public and private schools. This is done for two reasons: first, because we can expect 
decentralization to affect education outcomes in private schools too, since state-assisted 
schools are also included in this group2. Second, if we restrict the measurement of the 
survival rate to public schools, the variable will be affected by pupils transferring from 
private schools on completing compulsory education. Indeed, compulsory education is 
subsidised in most private schools (with the state paying a large part of the costs); 
however, this is not the case for non-compulsory education, and so some parents choose 
to transfer their children from the private to the public sector at this juncture. These 
circumstances will tend to lead to an overstating of the proportion of students who enrol 
in upper-secondary education after finishing compulsory education in public schools. 
However, we can also assume that the greater the number of pupils transferring from 
private schools, the better the quality of public education must be, as otherwise these 
                                                 
2 We verify this by estimating the effects of decentralization for public and private schools 
separately.  
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students would have preferred to stay in the private sector. Thus, an increase in the 
survival rate caused by this flux of students from the private to the public sector may be 
interpreted as an indication of an improvement in the quality of education in public 
schools. 
The data describing the number of pupils enrolled in each course were obtained 
from the Education Annuals published by the National Statistics Institute until 1985 and 
by the Ministry of Education and Science for all years after that date. The same annuals 
provide information on the number of teachers in secondary education, which is used to 
compute the pupil/teacher ratio. Thus, the pupil/teacher ratio variable is an average of 
the number of pupils per teacher in lower-secondary education, upper-secondary 
education and vocational training programmes, since it is not possible to obtain more 
disaggregated data.  
The per capita income series, measured in thousands of euros at 1990, is constructed 
from data published by the Fundación BBVA (period 1978-1986) and from the Regional 
Accounts published by the National Statistics Institute (period 1986-2005). The 
schooling variable, defined as the percentage of the working population holding a 
university degree, was calculated from the human capital series published by the 
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) and the Fundación BBVA. 
The unemployment rate that we use to obtain the results presented in this paper is the 
overall unemployment rate, although we obtain similar results with alternative measures 
of this statistic. These data are also obtained from the human capital series published by 
the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) and the Fundación 
BBVA.  
Finally, the decentralization dummy was constructed from the legislative acts 
providing for the transfer of educational powers from the central to the regional 
governments, and published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE). It takes a value of 
1 if province i lies in a decentralized Autonomous Community in year t, and 0 
otherwise. Alternatively, we define a series of program indicators jitd , which take a 
value of 1 if province i in time t has been in the program exactly j years (and zero 
otherwise) when 1, 2, ( 1)j J= −K , and a value of 1 if province i in time t has been in 
the program j or more years (and zero otherwise) when j J= . In this way, we obtain a 
more flexible specification, which allows us to consider the possibility that the effects 
of decentralization on the survival rate depend on the number of years since 
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decentralization of competences took place. Finally, we also define separate indicators 
for the regions that were decentralized during the eighties and the regions that were 
decentralized during the nineties. Given the different context in which educational 
powers were devolved to these two groups of regions, and the differing levels of 
experience of the governments on receiving them, we can expect the effects of the 
decentralization policy to be different. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Analysis of differences between regions before decentralization 
 
One of the main features of the Spanish process of decentralization has been the 
asymmetrical manner in which it has been conducted. While provinces with common 
historic, cultural and economic characteristics, islands and provinces with a historic 
regional status were able to accede to all the educational powers not specifically 
assigned to the central government in the Constitution at the beginning of the eighties, 
the other autonomous regions had to wait until the end of the nineties to receive the 
same powers. This feature of the decentralization process allows us to estimate the 
effect of decentralization on educational attainment by using the autonomous 
communities that are not decentralized as a comparison group for the regions that are 
decentralized in each time period. However, in order to ensure the consistent estimation, 
we need to control for any observable or non-observable variables that might have 
differed between the treated and the comparison group before decentralization, and 
which might also influence the evolution in educational outcomes. Although we do not 
expect such differences to exist in Spain, since the pathway taken by the 
decentralization process was decided on the basis of historical characteristics of the 
regions, we use the differences-in-differences estimation method, which accounts for 
any unobservable characteristics of the regions which may determine both student 
outcomes and the desire of regional governments to be granted powers in the field of 
education. Thus, we only need to analyse if, before the decentralization process started, 
there existed differences in the observable characteristics of the regions which may 
determine their educational attainment. If there are no differences, as we would expect, 
the group of regions that were decentralized in the eighties will be statistically 
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equivalent to the group of regions decentralized in the nineties in all dimensions except 
their treatment status, and we can use the differences-in-differences method to estimate 
the effect of decentralization. If there are differences in the observable characteristics of 
the regions, we only need to include them in the regression in order to identify the 
parameter of interest, thus obtaining the generalized differences-in-differences or linear-
matching differences-in-differences estimator.  
In Table 2 we compare the characteristics of the two groups of regions that might 
influence the evolution in their educational outcomes, before the decentralization 
process was set in motion, i.e. for the year 1980. As expected, no statistically significant 
differences can be appreciated for any of the variables being compared. Thus, we can 
conclude that the determinants of educational attainment did not influence inclusion in 
the decentralization process in Spain. As a consequence, we can consistently estimate 
the effects of decentralization without including any control variables in the regression, 
that is, by using the differences-in-differences estimation method. 
 
6.2. Regression analysis  
 
In what follows we present the differences-in-differences estimator of the effects of 
decentralization on educational attainment in Spain. Since the decentralization process 
in Spain began at the start of the eighties and terminated at the end of the nineties, we 
use a panel data set comprising the 50 provinces of  Spain for the period 1978-2005. In 
this way, we include observations both before and after decentralization, as is required 
when applying the differences-in-differences estimation method. Educational attainment 
is measured using  two alternative variables. Both variables are measures of the survival 
rate, defined as the ratio between the number of pupils that enrol in upper-secondary 
(non-compulsory) education and those that were enrolled in the final year of lower-
secondary (compulsory) education one year before. The only difference in the two 
variables is that one does not include those pupils that enrolled on vocational training 
programmes upon completion of their compulsory education (labelled in the tables of 
results as “Without VT”), while the other variable does (labelled as “With VT”). 
Decentralization is measured with the decentralization dummy variable as defined 
above, which takes the value of 1 when the province i is in a decentralized autonomous 
region at time t and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3 shows the results we obtained from this analysis. As can be seen in column 
1, the effect of decentralization on the survival rate “without VT” is positive and 
significant. Thus, according to these results, the decentralization process increased the 
survival rate in a province by an average of more than 1.6 percent. However, when the 
survival rate measure includes pupils that enrolled on vocational training programmes 
after finishing compulsory education (column 2), decentralization appears as a non 
significant factor in explaining educational attainment.  
However, we should bear in mind that this is an average impact across regions, 
while decentralization would have had heterogeneous effects. Since the regions of Spain 
are highly heterogeneous in terms of some of their characteristics, a reform that has a 
positive effect in one region might well have the opposite effect in another region. 
Although we cannot identify the effects of the treatment on every region i, in columns 3 
and 4 we do analyse whether the effects of decentralization depend on the per capita 
income and the per capita public revenues of the regions3, by including interaction 
terms between the decentralization dummy and these two variables. Given the previous 
evidence reported on this issue (Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2001; Galiani, Gertler and 
Schargrodsky, 2008; Barankay and Lockwood, 2007), we would expect the effects of 
decentralization to be greater in the richer regions. Effectively, when vocational training 
pupils are not included in the survival rate (column 3), the coefficient on the interaction 
term between the decentralization and the per capita income variables is positive and 
significant, although the decentralization dummy coefficient is no longer significant. 
Thus, if we suppose that the per capita income in a region is 12.83 thousands of euros 
(as in Madrid in 2000, when it received its educational powers), the effect of 
decentralization would be to increase the survival rate by 3.32 percent. However, if the 
per capita income in a region is 7.48 thousands of euros (as in Extremadura in 2000, 
when it received its education powers), the effect of decentralizing the education policy 
would be to increase the survival rate by 1.93 percent. By contrast, in column 4, where 
the survival rate measure also includes vocational training pupils, the interaction term 
between per capita income and decentralization does not show a significant effect. 
Rather, the decentralization variable coefficient now presents a negative sign and it is 
                                                 
3 The amount of public revenues at the disposal of the regional governments includes tax revenues and 
central government transfers (excepting transfers for specific services others than education). In the 
case of Pais Vasco and Navarra, which have a different funding system, public revenues are 
obtained as the difference between tax revenues and the transfers to the central government (data 
from BADESPE).  
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significant. As discussed above, vocational training programmes are not as attractive to 
the population as the general programmes are. Thus, these results appear to show how 
regional governments respond to public preferences, by trying to increase enrolment 
rates on general programmes, while in all probability neglecting vocational training 
programmes. Finally, our results show that the effects of decentralization do not vary 
with the level of a region’s public revenues.  
 
6.3. Alternative measures of decentralization  
 
Although by using the decentralization dummy variable we can consistently 
estimate the ATET, a more flexible specification can be obtained by replacing the 
dummy variable with a series of indicators jitd , which take a value of 1 if province i in 
time t has been in the program exactly j years (and zero otherwise) when 
1,2, ( 1)j J= −K , and a value of 1 if province i in time t has been in the program j or 
more years (and zero otherwise) when j J= . In this way, we allow the effects of 
decentralization to depend on the number of years that have passed since measures of 
decentralization were introduced in each region. Table 4 presents our results when we 
estimate this specification in columns 1 and 2. In column 1 we can observe that in the 
first year in which decentralization is initiated (year of decentralization), there is an 
increase in the survival rate without VT of more than 1.6 percent, an effect that is also 
captured by the single dummy variable (Table 3). However, it is also observed that 
decentralization now has an increasing positive impact on the survival rate measure in 
the years that follow. This means that, although decentralization has a positive impact 
on the survival rate without VT from the first year in which it is set in motion, the effect 
increases as the regional governments have time to implement various measures that can 
improve educational attainment or as the impact of these measures makes itself felt on 
the survival rate.  
A further result of interest, and one that is captured by this table, is the fact that 
when using this more flexible specification we also appreciate a negative impact of 
decentralization on the survival rate that includes pupils who enrol on vocational 
training programmes upon completion of compulsory education. Since these negative 
effects appear after the first year of decentralization, they are not captured by the single 
dummy variable. However, we can see that the negative coefficients of the 
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decentralization indicators diminish in absolute value with the passing of the years, and 
are only significant in the two years immediately following decentralization.  
Given these results, we can conclude again that the decentralization policy has had a 
positive effect on the proportion of pupils that enrol in Bachillerato upon completion of 
lower-secondary education. As we have seen, incrementing this rate is one of the main 
challenges currently facing the Spanish education system, so that it might in turn 
increment its upper-secondary graduation rates, which remain relatively low when 
compared internationally. However, the negative impact of decentralization on the 
survival rate that includes pupils on vocational training programmes (at least during the 
first few years) is not so encouraging. This result would seem to reflect two factors. On 
the one hand, it might be the case that following decentralization regional governments 
decided to introduce stricter rules within the educational system. Although such 
measures seem to have achieved the objective of increasing the proportion of pupils that 
enrol in Bachillerato upon completion of compulsory education, it is possible that, at 
the same time, pupils that otherwise would have enrolled on vocational training 
programmes have been unable to obtain the lower-secondary education certificate. On 
the other hand, these results might reflect a better match between public preferences and 
education policy. Since vocational training programmes are generally less attractive to 
pupils than the general educational programmes, regional governments might have 
concentrated their efforts and resources on improving the latter programmes, which at 
the same time could have had a negative impact on enrolment in vocational training 
programmes during the first few years of decentralization.   
Up to this juncture, we have analysed the combined effects of decentralization in 
those regions that received decentralized powers at the beginning of the eighties and 
those that received these competences at the end of the nineties. A more detailed insight 
of the effects of decentralization can be obtained by analysing the effects on the two 
groups of regions separately, since they are not necessarily the same: first, because at 
the beginning of the eighties the autonomous regions had just been created, while at the 
end of the nineties the regional governments had acquired almost twenty years of 
operational experience; and second, because the social, economic and financial contexts 
were very different in the two periods. To do this, we created two new sets of indicators, 
_ 80 jitTreated  and _ 90 jitTreated , which identify decentralization in the two groups of 
regions separately. We present the results of using separate indicators for each group in 
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columns 3 to 6 of Table 4. As expected, the estimated effects of decentralization 
differed between the two groups of regions. First, while in regions that were 
decentralized at the beginning of the eighties the process recorded its full impact on the 
survival rate without VT during the year of decentralization, in regions that were 
decentralized at the end of the nineties the effects of decentralization were not 
significant until three years after decentralization. However, from this moment the 
impact of decentralization was increasingly positive. A possible explanation for this 
difference is that, when at the beginning of the eighties the regions received their 
educational competences reform was urgently needed, such reforms were not so obvious 
at the end of the nineties. Thus, changes were only introduced later or, it might be the 
case that their effects took longer to be noticed. Whatever the explanation, the effects 
appear to be more significant at the end of the nineties, perhaps reflecting the greater 
experience acquired by regional governments in the intervening decade. Second, the 
negative impact of decentralisation on the survival rate with VT students was recorded 
only at the end of the nineties, and was not significant at the beginning of the eighties. 
This negative effect, however, only remained significant in the three years following 
decentralization, and disappeared in the fourth year.  
Thus, what can be concluded from these results is that, at the beginning of the 
eighties, decentralization only had a positive effect on the survival rate without VT, and 
that this was felt immediately during the first year of decentralization. By contrast, at 
the end of the nineties, decentralization had a negative impact on the proportion of 
pupils that enrolled in vocational training programmes. However, three years after 
decentralization this negative impact started to be offset by the positive impact on the 
proportion of pupils that were enrolling in Bachillerato, and after four years the impact 
had been fully countered, so that the overall effect was not significant. 
  
6.4. Regression analysis by sex and by type of institution 
 
Up to this juncture, we have analysed public and private schools together, and we 
have not distinguished between male and female students. One reason for this analysis 
is that private schools include Spain’s state-assisted schools, which as such are also 
affected by government education policies. A second reason was to avoid the 
measurement problem that the transfer of pupils between public and private schools 
could cause for our outcome variable. However, it is interesting to analyse the effects of 
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decentralization separately for both public and private schools and for male and female 
students. In this way, we should be able to determine whether decentralization has had 
any impact on the survival rate in private schools. Likewise, as we can interpret any 
increase in the survival rate in public schools (because of pupils transferring from 
private schools) as a sign of an improvement in the quality of public education quality, 
it is also interesting to conduct the analysis for public schools separately. Similarly, it is 
interesting to see if male and female students respond distinctly to a policy change such 
as those ushered in by decentralization. These results are summarised in Table 5. Panel 
A shows the results when the dependent variable is the male survival rate, and Panel B 
the results when the dependent variable is the female survival rate. In columns 1 and 2 
we include all schools (public and private), while in columns 3 and 4 only public 
schools are included. The effect of decentralization on the survival rate in private 
schools is not shown because it is always non significant. Thus, despite the fact that 
most private schools are publicly funded, the decentralization process in Spain had no 
effect on their survival rate. However, this is not the same as saying that it had no effect 
on educational attainment in private schools, just that the proportion of students who 
stayed on at private schools to study upper-secondary education did not change. 
However, it is still possible that decentralization increased the proportion of pupils that 
enrolled in upper secondary education in public schools after completing their 
compulsory education in private schools.  
The main result of note contained in this table is that decentralization had a positive 
impact both on male and female survival rates not including VT pupils, although the 
speed with which this impact was felt varied. However, when vocational training pupils 
are included in the survival rate measure, we see that decentralization only affected the 
male survival rate.  
 
7. Robustness analysis 
 
In this section we run a number of additional regressions in order to show the 
robustness of the results presented above. First, we estimate the linear matching 
differences-in-differences specification of the outcomes equation, i.e., we include in our 
regression function the control variables considered above as possible determinants of 
educational attainment: 
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it i t it it itY d Xθ α β ε= Φ + + + +  (6) 
 
where itX  is the matrix of control variables, which also includes the lagged 
dependent variable. In this way, we can corroborate that the inclusion or otherwise of 
these variables does not affect the estimated impact of decentralization on the survival 
rate. As explained in greater detail above, this is because inclusion within the 
decentralization process did not depend on these variables, so that their omission in the 
outcomes equation does not affect the estimated decentralization parameter. However, 
we do need to take into account that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in 
the regression analysis introduces a source of endogeneity into our equation. In order to 
solve this problem, we instrument the lagged dependent variable after differencing 
equation (6), using as an instrument the second lag of the dependent variable, as 
suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). As before, we compute robust variance 
estimates and conduct our estimations by clustering the error term by autonomous 
communities. 
Finally, we estimate the so called random trend model specification. The main 
advantage of this alternative specification is that each region is allowed to have its own 
time trend, which allows us to relax the more restrictive assumption of the differences-
in-differences model of common macroeconomic effects. Thus, the outcome equation to 
be estimated in this case is: 
 
it i t i it itY t dθ ψ α ε= Φ + + + +  (7) 
 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6. If we look at columns 1, 3 
and 5, we can see that our results for the effects of decentralization on the survival rate 
without VT are robust. We find that decentralization had a positive and significant effect 
on the survival rate without VT independently of the specification that we use. In 
column 5, where we also included the interaction terms, we observe that the richer the 
region is, the greater the effects of decentralization are. We can see that both the 
differences-in-differences specification (Table 3) and the linear matching with 
differences-in-differences specification (Table 6, column 1) present exactly the same 
value of the parameter of the decentralization variable. Rather, the specification that 
allows for specific regional time trends provides us with a slightly higher parameter 
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value. However, as pointed out by Heckman and Hotz (1989), we should not expect 
exactly the same estimated parameter from alternative non-experimental methods, since 
they are based on different assumptions regarding the distribution of the differences 
between regions. Thus, the key point here is that alternative methods lead us to the same 
conclusions regarding the benefits of decentralization.  
Similarly, the effects of decentralization on the survival rate with VT that we obtain 
with these alternative specifications are the same as those recorded before. In columns 
2, 4 and 6 of Table 6 we see that, while the single dummy variable is unable to capture 
the negative impact of decentralization in either the random trend model or the linear 
matching with differences-in-differences, it does do so when the interaction terms are 
included in the regression. Thus, although we do not obtain significant effects in some 
specifications, the results seem to point to the conclusion that decentralization had a 
negative impact on the survival rate measure which includes vocational training pupils. 
However, the results are not as clear in the case of the survival rate measure which does 
not include VT pupils.  
We can observe the impact of school inputs on the survival rate in columns 1 and 2. 
As we can see, the coefficient of the per capita income variable is positive and 
significant, as we would expect if we take into account the previous evidence reported 
in this field. However, the pupil/teacher ratio, the schooling variable, the unemployment 
rate and the first lag of the dependent variable are not significant. Although these results 
seem to confirm previous evidence as to which inputs matter when explaining 
educational outcomes, caution should be exercised before drawing any definitive 
conclusions. It should be borne in mind that the coefficients of the input variables would 
be biased if other inputs, correlated with those that were included, had been omitted. 
Given the difficulty of specifying an outcome equation which includes all relevant 
family and school inputs, we should not rule out the possible existence of omitted 
variables. Further, other endogeneity problems might serve to bias the coefficients of 
these variables. However, we are confident that the omission of input variables or their 
endogeneity does not affect the estimator of the effect of decentralization, i.e., the one 
which concerns us here.   
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8. Conclusions  
 
The effects of decentralization on the productive efficiency of government remain 
unclear in the theoretical literature, which tends to emphasise the trade-offs between 
potential benefits and drawbacks. However, until recently, very few empirical studies 
had attempted to examine these trade-offs. At a time when decentralization policies are 
on the agenda of many countries and figure among the main recommendations 
emanating from international organizations, we considered it timely to offer some 
insights into this problem. Specifically, we have focused on the impact of 
decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain, although a similar analysis could be 
extended to other areas of public policy.  
As we have seen, the decentralization process in education started at the beginning 
of the eighties, when educational powers were devolved to Cataluña, País Vasco, 
Galicia, Andalucía, Comunidad Valenciana and Canarias. The fact that the other 
autonomous regions had to wait until the end of the nineties to receive the same powers 
enables us to use these non-decentralized regions as the control group and so estimate 
the effects of decentralization. Although it is our belief that the selection process was 
not influenced by regional characteristics, which in turn might also have influenced the 
evolution of educational outcomes, we use the differences-in-differences method to 
estimate the effects of decentralization. In this way, we are able to control not only for 
the temporary shocks that affect the outcomes of all regions equally (such as central 
government reform), but also for the non-observable characteristics of the regions that 
may influence the evolution of their educational outcomes and which could result in 
differences between the treatment and comparison group before decentralization.  
According to our analysis, decentralization in Spain increased the survival rate 
(when pupils enrolled on vocational training programmes are not included) by more 
than 1.6 percent on average. When we allow the effects to differ in accordance with the 
observable characteristics of the regions, we see that this effect increases with the per 
capita income of the region - the difference in the effect on rich and poor regions being 
more than one percent. However, decentralization had a negative or non-significant 
impact on the survival rate when vocational training pupils were included. This result 
appears to be attributable to the fact that less attention has traditionally been dedicated 
to vocational training programmes in Spain. While it is true that in recent years 
politicians have shown more concern for vocational training programmes, in response to 
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increasing evidence regarding the shortfall in the number of skilled workers in the 
Spanish labour market, this was not the case during the period analysed. These results 
might be interpreted as evidence of the better match between the preferences of the 
public and educational policies under a decentralized system, since vocational training 
programmes in Spain remain comparatively unattractive.   
When the effects of decentralisation are allowed to depend on the number of years 
that have transpired since the devolution of powers to region and on the specific wave 
of decentralization, we obtain a broader view of how these effects worked. The main 
conclusion we draw is that the effects of decentralization were greater at the end of the 
nineties than at the beginning of the eighties, which may in part reflect the experience 
acquired by autonomous governments in the implementation of their educational 
competences. Moreover, although the effects take longer to be noticed at the end of the 
nineties, they are increasing over time. We also observe that the negative impact of 
decentralization on the survival rate when VT students were included only occurred at 
the end of the nineties, and was seen to disappear after three years under a decentralised 
system.  
Our analysis of the effects of decentralization by institutional type showed that 
educational outcomes were only affected in the case of public schools, despite the fact 
that most private schools in Spain are publicly funded. However, this does not mean 
that the decentralization process had no effect on educational attainment in private 
schools, just that the proportion of students who remained in these institutions to study 
upper secondary education did not alter. Thus, it would be interesting to analyze 
whether decentralization had an impact on other measures of educational attainment in 
lower secondary education in private schools.  
When analysing the effects of decentralization by sex, we found that devolution had 
a positive impact both on male and on female survival rates when vocational training 
pupils were not included. However, when vocational training pupils were included in 
the survival rate measure, we found that decentralization only affected the male survival 
rate.  
Finally, in the last section we were able to corroborate the robustness of our results 
by using two alternative models that enabled us to relax some of the assumptions 
needed for the differences-in-differences estimator to be consistent. We first estimated 
the linear matching with differences-in-differences model, which involved adding the 
variables that are considered as being the determinants of educational attainment to our 
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previous specification. Second, we specified a random trend model thereby relaxing the 
hypothesis that the regions respond in the same way to a macroeconomic shock. Both 
specifications allow us to corroborate the conclusions outlined above, namely, that the 
decentralization process in Spain has had a positive impact on the survival rate without 
VT, and that the richer the region, the more marked this effect was.  
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Table 1. Statutes of Autonomy and educational transfer decrees  
      
  Autonomous Community Statutes of Autonomy Constitutional Laws 
Educational transfers  
decrees 
  Andalucía 6/1981  3936/1982 
  Aragón  8/1982  1982/1998 
  Asturias  7/1981 2081/1999 
  Baleares  2/1983 1876/1997 
  Canarias  10/1982 2091/1983 
  Cantabria  8/1981 2671/1998 
  Castilla y León  4/1983 1340/1999 
  Castilla La Mancha  9/1982 1844/1999 
  Cataluña  4/1979 2809/1980 
  Extremadura  1/1983 1801/1999 
  Galicia  1/1981 1763/1982 
  Madrid  3/1983 926/1999 
  Murcia  4/1982 938/1999 
  Navarra  13/1982  1070/1990 
  País Vasco  3/1979  2808/1980 
  La Rioja  3/1982  1826/1998 
  C. Valenciana  5/1982  2093/1983 
   
Source: Boletín Oficial del Estado (BOE) 
 
Table 2. Analysis of differences between treated and comparison regions in 1980. 
    
Treated Group Comparison Group   Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Difference 
  Survival rate without VT (Public 
schools) 74.79 5.41 74.45 5.86 -0.33
  Survival rate without VT (Private 
schools) 76.63 5.55 77.01 8.58 0.37
  Survival rate without VT (All schools) 75.48 4.01 75.51 4.45 0.02
  Survival rate with VT (Public schools) 72.36 5.64 73.84 9.93 1.48
  Survival rate with VT (Private schools) 52.04 12.53 55.91 11.11 3.86
  Survival rate with VT (All schools) 64.88 2.82 66.62 5.02 1.74
  Pupil-teacher ratio (Public schools) 16.91 1.16 16.88 1.14 -0.04
  Pupil-teacher ratio (Private schools) 14.99 2.82 14.34 1.81 -0.65
  Pupil-teacher ratio (All schools) 16.29 1.23 15.93 0.97 -0.36
  Per capita income 4.58 0.76 4.46 0.80 -0.12
  Schooling 6.36 1.57 6.91 1.72 0.55
  Unemployment rate 11.04 5.48 9.04 3.18 -1.99
      
Note: In the treated group we include Cataluña, País Vasco, Galicia, Andalucía, Valencia and Canarias, while the 
remaining communities are included in the comparison group. The column labelled ‘difference’ records the difference 
in mean between the treated and the comparison group for each variable. We conducted a t-test on the equality of 
means; *, ** and *** indicate that the difference is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3. Regression analysis  
     
 
Differences-in-differences Differences-in-differences       with interaction terms 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
   Decentralization dummy 1.652 -0.850 0.109 -1.959 
 (0.60)** (0.72) (0.99) (0.96)* 
     
   Decent. x income   0.373 0.336 
   (0.18)* (0.23) 
     
   Decent. x public revenues   -0.845 -1.203 
   (0.72) (1.76) 
     
   Temporal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
   R-squared 0.227 0.258 0.228 0.259 
     
   Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 
     
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. 
We estimate equation (2) in first differences, by pooled OLS. Our data base is a panel data set which 
includes the 50 provinces of Spain for the period 1978-2005. The dependent variable is the survival rate, 
“without VT” when it does not includes pupils that enrol on vocational training programmes upon 
completion of their compulsory education, and “with VT” when these pupils are included. The 
decentralization variable is defined with a dummy which takes the values 1, when the province i is in a 
decentralized autonomous region at time t, and 0 otherwise. Control variables are not included in the 
regression, so that the estimated effect corresponds to the differences-in-differences estimator of the 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). Temporal Fixed Effects are included in all the 
specifications; “Yes” means that they are jointly significant, and “No” means that they are not significant. 
The error terms are clustered at the Autonomous Community level and the variance covariance matrix 
estimate is robust.   
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Table 4. Alternative measures of decentralization 
       
 
1 set of indicators 2 set of indicators 
 djit Treated_80jit Treated_90jit 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
   Year of decentralization 1.643 -0.958 2.006 0.003 1.268 -2.005 
 (0.58)** (0.71) (0.96)* (0.82) (0.83) (1.59) 
   1 year after decent. 1.320 -2.156 1.190 -0.296 1.326 -4.312 
 (0.62)** (0.89)** (1.29) (1.09) (1.23) (1.57)** 
   2 years after decent. 1.603 -2.354 1.758 0.068 1.373 -5.162 
 (0.80)* (1.06)** (1.16) (1.19) (1.24) (2.00)** 
   3 years after decent. 1.906 -1.773 1.199 0.630 2.673 -4.324 
 (1.32) (1.15) (2.20) (1.54) (0.92)** (2.38)* 
   4 years after decent. 2.347 -1.571 0.536 -0.876 4.290 -2.277 
 (0.91)** (1.05) (1.22) (1.84) (1.19)*** (2.75) 
   5 years after decent. 2.965 -0.321 1.963 1.342 4.086 -1.902 
 (1.09)** (1.01) (1.35) (1.93) (1.42)** (2.78) 
       
   Temporal Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
       
   R-squared 0.228 0.262 0.233 0.271 0.233 0.271 
       
   Number of observations 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 1350 
       
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. We estimate 
equation (2) in first differences, by pooled OLS. Our data base is a panel data set which includes the 50 provinces of 
Spain for the period 1978-2005. The dependent variable is the survival rate, “without VT” when it does not includes 
pupils that enrol on vocational training programmes upon completion of their compulsory education, and “with VT” 
when these pupils are included. The decentralization is measured with a set of J indicators in columns 1 and 2, which 
take the values 1 when a region has been decentralized exactly j years before if j=1,2,…J-1, or when a region has been 
decentralized j or more years before if j=J; in columns 3 to 6 decentralization is measured with two sets of dummies 
which distinguish between regions that were decentralized at the beginning of the eighties and the regions that were 
decentralized at the end of the nineties. Control variables are not included in the regression. Temporal Fixed Effects are 
included in all the specifications; “Yes” means that they are jointly significant, and “No” means that they are not 
significant. The error terms are clustered at the Autonomous Community level and the variance covariance matrix 
estimate is robust.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39
Table 5. Effects of decentralization by sex and by type of institution 
 All Schools Public Schools 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Male survival rate      
     
   Year of decentralization 1.825 -1.322 1.816 -2.765 
 (1.16) (1.21) (1.04)* (1.41)* 
   1 year after decent. 1.482 -2.383 2.013 -3.275 
 (1.03) (1.47) (1.14)* (1.35)** 
   2 years after decent. 1.988 -2.763 2.924 -3.536 
 (1.49) (1.48)* (1.78) (1.49)** 
   3 years after decent. 1.786 -1.490 2.716 -2.485 
 (1.82) (1.20) (2.45) (2.41) 
   4 years after decent. 2.946 -1.511 4.558 -2.498 
 (1.23)** (1.24) (1.56)** (1.94) 
   5 years after decent. 1.773 -1.485 2.085 -2.794 
 (1.59) (1.44) (1.90) (1.57)* 
     
Panel B. Female survival rate      
     
   Year of decentralization 1.483 -0.491 0.914 -1.526 
 (0.49)*** (0.91) (0.78) (1.56) 
   1 year after decent. 1.181 -1.918 1.542 -2.254 
 (0.70) (1.11) (1.06) (1.73) 
   2 years after decent. 1.340 -1.872 2.431 -1.495 
 (0.67)* (1.37) (1.08)** (2.01) 
   3 years after decent. 1.954 -1.983 3.216 -1.363 
 (1.27) (1.49) (1.72)* (2.78) 
   4 years after decent. 1.936 -1.499 3.347 -2.381 
 (1.09)* (1.50) (1.45)** (1.95) 
   5 years after decent. 4.106 1.061 5.561 1.048 
 (1.65)** (1.93) (2.14)** (2.58) 
     
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. We 
estimate equation (2) in first differences, by pooled OLS. Our data base is a panel data set which includes the 50 
provinces of Spain for the period 1978-2005. The dependent variable is the male survival rate in Panel A and 
the female survival rate in Panel B. In columns 1 and 2 we compute the survival rate in all schools (public and 
private), “without VT” when it does not includes pupils that enrol on vocational training programmes upon 
completion of their compulsory education, and “with VT” when these pupils are included; and in columns 3 and 
4 the survival rate in public schools, also “without VT” and “with VT”. The decentralization is measured with a 
set of J indicators in columns 1 and 2, which take the values 1 when a region has been decentralized exactly j 
years before if j=1,2,…J-1, or when a region has been decentralized j or more years before if j=J; in columns 3 
to 6 decentralization is measured with two sets of dummies which distinguish between regions that were 
decentralized at the beginning of the eighties and the regions that were decentralized at the end of the nineties. 
Control variables are not included in the regression. Temporal and Regional Fixed Effects are included in all the 
specifications; “Yes” means that they are jointly significant, and “No” means that they are not significant. The 
error terms are clustered at the Autonomous Community level and the variance covariance matrix estimate is 
robust.   
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Table 6. Robustness analysis. 
       
 Linear Matching        
differences-in-differences Random Trend Model 
Random Trend Model     
with interaction terms 
 Without VT With VT Without VT With VT Without VT With VT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
   Decentralization dummy 1.652 -0.830 2.127 -0.349 0.263 -2.225 
 (0.58)** (0.72) (0.75)** (0.82) (1.26) (1.17)* 
   Decent. x income     0.499 0.353 
     (0.22)** (0.38) 
   Decent. x public revenues     -1.433 -0.167 
     (0.87) (2.20) 
   Survival rate (-1) -0.060 -0.095     
 (0.09) (0.11)     
   Pupils per teacher ratio 0.198 0.253     
 (0.20) (0.16)     
   Income 0.547 0.396     
 (0.18)*** (0.20)*     
   Schooling 0.076 -0.082     
 (0.08) (0.12)     
   Unemployment rate 0.001 -0.021     
 (0.05) (0.04)     
       
   Temporal Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
       
   Regional Time Trends - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
       
   R-squared - - 0.162 0.153 0.164 0.154 
       
   Number of observations 1250 1250 1300 1300 1300 1300 
       
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. In columns 1 and 
2 we estimate equation (6). Since the control variables include the lagged dependent variable we use the instrumental 
variables approach to estimate the effect of decentralization on the differenced equation, using the second lag of the 
dependent variable in levels as instrument. In columns 3 to 6 we estimate equation (7) after differencing it two times, by 
pooled OLS. Our data base is a panel data set which includes the 50 provinces of Spain for the period 1978-2005. The 
dependent variable is the survival rate, “without VT” when it does not includes pupils that enrol on vocational training 
programmes upon completion of their compulsory education, and “with VT” when these pupils are included. The 
decentralization variable is defined with a dummy which takes the values 1, when the province i is in a decentralized 
autonomous region at time t, and 0 otherwise. Temporal and Regional Fixed Effects are included in all the specifications; 
“Yes” means that they are jointly significant, and “No” means that they are not significant. The error terms are clustered at 
the Autonomous Community level and the variance covariance matrix estimate is robust.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
